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Abstract: A measure of time is related to the number of ways by which the human correlates the past
and the future for some process. On this basis, a connection between time and entropy (information,
Boltzmann–Gibbs, and thermodynamic one) is established. This measure gives time such properties
as universality, relativity, directionality, and non-uniformity. A number of issues of the modern
science related to the finding of laws describing changes in nature are discussed. A special emphasis
is made on the role of evolutionary adaptation of an observer to the surrounding world.
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1. Introduction
The development of science and our understanding of the world demonstrates a gradual transition
from static and absolute concepts to evolutionary and relative ones. The Earth is no longer a
firm center of the Cosmos, but only one of the planets formed approximately 4.5 billion years ago
travelling, similarly to an infinite multitude of other celestial bodies, around the Universe. Living
beings are not unique creatures; they are but a result of the evolutionary adaptation to a changing
environment. The human, as well as the human brain, societies, languages, notions of beauty, etc.
evolve. We widely apply the concept of time in order to describe observed changes. However, every
man-made branch of science associates its own understanding and properties with this concept.
Biological time, psychological time, and historical time, even physics has different times: time in
mechanics (classical and quantum) and electrodynamics is reversible and is included in equations
as an independent variable (parameter); in contrast, thermodynamics employs irreversible time,
while the classical cosmology of the expanding Universe uses irreversible time and additionally
considers that it is influenced, for instance, by massive bodies. Such a diversity of times has appeared
historically as scientific knowledge grew. Some branches of science have been developing without any
considerable interaction with one another. However, such an interaction starts sooner or later. In this
case, a difference in basic concepts may cause problems, contradictions, and paradoxes. Particularly,
this is observed in physics when attempting to correlate the description of phenomena from the
perspectives of quantum physics and the general relativity theory as well as using mechanics and
thermodynamics. If dynamic phenomena described by time in these sciences have fundamentally
different properties (specifically, reversibility and irreversibility), can we apply one time even within
the framework of physics? Can it be that there are several times, and we erroneously identify them
with one variable in equations? Such questions have arisen in physics before (see, for example, [1]) but
they fail to attract great attention. Nevertheless, this problem seems to be fundamental and crucial.
In this regard, a measure of time needs to be determined (introduced) in a uniform and universal
manner and, on this basis, every individual branch of science and, subsequently, their interrelations
should be reviewed.
Let us emphasize another important point related to time. By studying the variability of some
properties of the surrounding world, scientists try to mathematically formalize the developments
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in the form of laws using, among other things, the concept of time. In a number of cases, mostly in
physics, this is successfully implemented. Such laws are the results of creative insights, generalizations
and the like of the great scientists of the past: I. Newton, J. Maxwell, A. Einstein, E. Schrödinger, etc.
Can the same be obtained using a measure of time as the basis? Can a deductive analysis of a measure
of time introduced in a uniform manner together with some model of the surrounding reality lead to
equations similar to the laws of mechanics, electromagnetism, etc.? This may prove to be especially
important in the fields where generally-acknowledged laws are missing—for example, in biology,
ecology, psychology, economics, linguistics, or history.
The issues raised above are crucial for the successful development of science. Certainly, it is
not the purpose hereof to solve them. The purpose of this study is to introduce a measure of time
in such a manner that these questions could potentially be answered in the future. Universality
(i.e., the possibility to consider and apply it within the existing concepts of natural and human
sciences), measurability, and finally, fruitfulness (i.e., it should enable, if necessary, to deductively
obtain dynamic laws of the surrounding world) should be the most important properties of such a
measure. This investigation considerably expands on our ideas that have been previously set forth
in [2,3]. In addition, we adopt a somewhat risky (from physicists' point of view) plan for introducing a
measure of time: by relying on psychology. Here, considering that we work with such a concept as time
and present our ideas in the multidisciplinary journal, this decision seems to be the most natural one.
2. A Measure of Time and Its Prerequisites
Different aspects of the concept of time, from philosophical to engineering, are presented in an
enormous number of works that have been published throughout many centuries. It will take more
than one volume just to provide a list of these books. Let us very briefly formulate a number of ideas
that play an important role for the purposes hereof, and can only be partially considered original and
generally represent rewordings and interpretations of some part of the works dedicated to time and
related issues. The ideas (and facts) listed below, which can be regarded either as axioms, or more
or less rough assumptions, are prerequisites forming a basis of the definition of a measure of time
proposed at the end of this section.
A measure of time is needed to describe a change. If our world remained unchanged, there would
be no need for this concept. Here, we do not go deep into philosophical questions such as: Why do
changes occur? We also categorically reject the metaphysical idea that time causes (drives) changes.
A measure of time is a property (manifestation) of the consciousness (cognition and the like)
and surroundings of an observer, i.e., it is related to one and the other. Without changes in either
the consciousness or the surroundings, the concept of time would not have appeared. There is no
time both in a world without an observer and for an observer without a changing surrounding world.
There is no point in referring to an abstract observer for the purposes of this article; instead, a human,
people, should be taken into consideration.
The human brain is an open dynamic system representing a product of evolution and adjustment
to the evolving surrounding world. Therefore, the concept of a measure of time cannot be absolute or
static but is instead relative and dynamic. Here, we agree with the corresponding ideas of, specifically,
K. Lorenz (rather than I. Kant) that a priori forms of cognition (specifically, the understanding of time)
should be regarded as adaptation because they are connected with the brain that has acquired its
reasonable species-preserving form thanks to interactions with the reality during evolution. In this
respect, it is important to mention the results of the investigations conducted by J. Piaget, upon an
initiative of A. Einstein, that children have no understanding of time in infancy and they adopt this
concept at later stages of development.
The understanding of time is related to such brain functions as memory, sensation, perception,
and thinking. We have no special receptors for sensing time (as, for instance, for smells). As a
consequence, the understanding of time represents a very complex process of the brain, connecting
the past (related, for the most part, to memory) with the future (related to imagination, thinking).
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It is an important feature of this process that the brain does not function unmistakably; hence,
the correlation between duration of a change and a measure of time cannot be unambiguous. Indeed,
when recollecting, we always perform some work on a recollection and transform it; data are not
simply retrieved from a storage and then returned in their original form but are recreated every time.
It is also important that our memories, as well as imagination, are controlled by the same parts of
the brain. That is why memory and imagination can mix because all the necessary information is
not wholly contained in the memory, but is reconstructed when accessing it on the basis, for instance,
of some semantic information (see, for example, [4]).
Thus, the brain's measurement of the duration of some phenomenon (change) is associated with
some process that links the past with the future (let us call it the τ-process). The brain is neuroplastic
and uses for this process multiple structural elements distributed over the entire brain and connected
both in series and, what is important, in parallel. The past and the future of some phenomenon in
the brain are in a way imaginary and to a large extent ambiguous. As a consequence, in the case of
the τ-process in the brain, there should obviously be more than one way of correlating the past to the
future for one phenomenon. Let us designate the number of such ways as Ω. It is logical to assume
that the longer a change subjected to the τ-process in the brain, the more ambiguous its past/future
and the greater Ω (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Schematic llustration of dif er s of linking the past wi the future f r some
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In spite of the above tendency to mistakes, measurement of the duration of a changing process
must be a crucial property of the brain from the standpoint of evolution. As a consequence, the brain
must demonstrate reliability while implementing the τ-process (immunity to interference of both
external and intrinsic pr cesses). It is obvious that the l nger th process, the harder it is to ensure
such reliability. Each of Ω ways is differe t and can employ a different n mber and type of structural
elements. Consequently, the correlation of quantities associated with structural elements (or their
statistical moments) with the duration (measure of time) will not ensure reliability of the τ-process.
Therefore, it is Ω that seems to be the brain’s simplest robust scalar estimation of time.
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We shall postulate that the duration (time) τ of some change represents a single-valued monotone function
of Ω only, i.e., τ = F(Ω), and the larger Ω, the greater τ.
Let there be two phenomena with the durations τ1 and τ2 following each other (Figure 2). We shall
assume that the phenomena are independent (both objectively and from an observer’s perspective).
Then, if the number of ways assumed for the τ-process equals Ω1 and Ω2 for the first and the second
phenomenon respectively, the number of ways in the τ-process for the total duration process τ1 + τ2
will be equal to Ω1Ω2. As a result, we have τ1 + τ2 = F(Ω1) + F(Ω2) and τ1 + τ2 = F(Ω1Ω2), i.e.,
F(Ω1Ω2) = F(Ω1) + F(Ω2). As is well known (see, for example, [5]), a logarithmic function is the only
function satisfying such a property. (Here, F(1) = 0 is an important additional requirement. It can be
considered within the framework of the interpretation assumed herein that the only way of correlating
the past and the future in the brain may be implemented just for hypothetical zero-duration processes.)
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Thus, we arrive at the following relation between the measure of time of some phenomenon and
the number of ways of its representation during the τ-process in the brain.
τ = k lnΩ, (1)
where k is some coefficient related to the sed meas rement units of tim .
S , the duration (measure of time) is linked w th the num r of ways by which the brain r presents
some occur ing cha ge. Du to the cur ently i sufficient level of knowledge about consciou and
unconscious processes occurring in the brain, because of the astronomical number of structural
elements involved in the τ-process, and considering the existing experimental techniques and methods,
it is now impossible to directly determine Ω. However, Ω can be estimated indirectly. Measurement of
the total amount of energy consumed by the brain during the τ-process can be one of such estimations.
It is obvious that the larger Ω, the greater the value of the consumed energy, which, as is known,
is connected with oxygen consumption and can be presently measured with a sufficient accuracy.
We sh ll call this exp rimental method the E-method. Mathematic modeling can b another indirect
method of stimating Ω. So, using one model of a p no enon (with suppo ed or known restrictions)
or another, we calculate the number Ωm of ways by which the hange at hand can be represented.
Then it is assumed that, since both quantities, Ω and Ωm, correspond to the number of ways for
representing the duration of the same process using the same observer (brain), Ωm can serve as a
good indirect estimation (an estimation with an accuracy to some arbitrary constant multiplier) of
Ω. We shall call this theoretical method the T-method. Let us remark on the T-method. As a rule,
created models are based on some provisions of the modern science, which, in their turn, represent a
product of the collective adaptation of people to a changing, evolving environment. Similarly to the
brain that has been “learning” to register changes in its surroundings with the help of time, science
has also been evolving in order to correctly reflect the changing world. For this reason, in a number of
cases, the T-method can provide a value of Ωm that describes change in the world better than a more
individual characteristic, Ω.
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3. Time and Entropy
If entropy is determined as a measure of uncertainty in a rather general form as proposed by
C. Shannon (following L Boltzmann) [5,6], then, according to (1), time and entropy will be almost
identical concepts (with an accuracy to some positive dimensional multiplier). Entropy as a logarithm
of the number of temporal trajectories linking some past and future is also referred to as the trajectory
entropy Str:
Str ∝ lnΩ. (2)
We shall use the T-method for estimating Ω. Let there be a model of some process. We shall
assume that there can be several values of Ωmi for given restrictions within the selected model.
According to (1), τi ∝ lnΩmi. As a result, the larger Ωmi, the greater τi. The greater τi of the process
corresponds to its longer duration (i.e., observability for a longer time period), whereas the longer
duration corresponds to the higher probability that this process will be registered by an observer who
becomes interested in the process within some random short (relative to the duration of the process
involved) time interval. Therefore, according to (2), a process corresponding to the maximum trajectory
entropy will be observed with the highest probability.
An example of a system’s evolution from the past to the future is presented in Figure 3 (some set
of Figures can be provided if not only the most probable process is considered). Since an increased
duration of a process (elapsed time) is directly connected with the number of trajectories (ways), then,
in such a presentation, trajectories can only “branch out” (forming two or more trajectories), but they
cannot group together, discontinue, or form loops. So, it is natural to suppose that the number Γ
of possible ways (microstates) corresponding to the system’s state at some moment of time can be
characterized by the number Ωm of trajectories linking the past with this state. In view of the above
peculiarity of the topology of trajectories, there should be a one-to-one correspondence between Γ and
Ωm (see, for example, Figure 4). The entropy SS as a logarithm of the number of possible microstates
for representing some state (macrostate) is often used in the literature: SS = lnΓ. Since Γ = Ωm and (1),
we have:
τ ∝ SS . (3)
Here and above, it is assumed that the initial state corresponds to the zero time; if we drop this
assumption, then, for the differences of the quantities at hand, we will obviously have the following:
∆τ ∝ ∆SS . (4)
Entropy 2017, 19, 345  5 of 10 
 
3. Time and Entropy 
If entropy is determined as a measure of uncertainty in a rather general form as proposed by C. 
Shannon (following L Boltzmann) [5,6], then, according to (1), time and entropy will be almost 
identical concepts (with an accuracy to some positive dimensional multiplier). Entropy as a logarithm 
of the number of temporal trajectories linking some past and future is also referred to as the trajectory 
entropy Str: 
Str ∝ lnΩ.  (2) 
We shall use the T-method for estimating Ω. Let there be a model of some process. We shall 
assume that there can be several values of Ωmi for given restrictions within the selected model. 
According to (1), τi ∝ lnΩmi. As a result, the larger Ωmi, the greater τi. The greater τi of the process 
corresponds to its longer duration (i.e., observability for a longer time period), whereas the longer 
duration corr sponds to the higher probability that this process will be registered by an observer who 
becomes interested in the proc ss within some random short (relative to the duration of the process 
involved) time interval. Therefore, according to (2), a process corresponding to the maximu  
trajectory entropy will be observed with the highest probability.  
An example of a system’s evolution from the past to the future is presented in Figure 3 (some 
set of Figures can be provided if not only the most probable process is considered). Since an increased 
duration of a process (elapsed time) is directly connected with the number of trajectories (ways), then, 
in such a presentation, trajectories can only “branch out” (forming two or more trajectories), but they 
cannot group together, discontinue, or form loops. So, it is natural to suppose that the number Γ of 
possible ways (microstates) corresponding to the system’s state at some moment of time can be 
characterized by the number Ωm f trajectorie  linking the past with this state. In view of the above 
peculiarity of th  topology of trajecto ies, there hould be a one-to-one corr sp ndence b tween Γ 
and Ωm (see, for ex mple, Figure 4). The e tropy SS as a log rithm of the number of possible 
microstates for representing some state (macrostate) is often used in the literature: SS = lnΓ. Since Γ = 
Ωm and (1), we have: 
τ ∝ SS . (3) 
Here and above, it is assumed that the initial state corresponds to the zero time; if we drop this 
assumption, then, for the differences of the quantities at hand, we will obviously have the following: 
Δτ ∝ ΔSS . (4) 
 
Figure 3. Time variation of trajectories linking the past with the future for some process. Trajectories 
can only branch out in the course of time. 
Ω2 Ω4Ω3Ω1
τ2 τ3 τ4τ1
Figure 3. Time variation f trajectories linking the st ith the future for some process. Trajectories
can only branch out in the course of time.
Entropy 2017, 19, 345 6 of 11Entropy 2017, 19, 345  6 of 10 
 
 
Figure 4. One-to-one correspondence between the number Γ of microstates (representing some state 
(macrostate) at some moment of time, τ and the number, Ω, of trajectories (ways) linking the past with 
these microstates. 
Let us consider some isolated system transiting from one thermodynamic equilibrium state to 
another thermodynamic equilibrium state during the time τ. Such a state is traditionally described in 
statistical physics by the Boltzmann–Gibbs entropy, SBG, that is connected with the number of a 
system’s microstates, ΓBG (for instance, for the given energy of the system), as SBG ∝ lnГBG [6,7]. 
Obviously, SBG is a particular case of SS. As a result, based on Equations (3) and (4), we write: 
τ ∝ SBG, (5) 
Δτ ∝ Δ SBG. (6) 
Thus, it is shown that, for a number of important cases, time (duration of a process) can be 
calculated by a variation in the Boltzmann–Gibbs entropy. Since this entropy is traditionally regarded 
as the statistic interpretation of the thermodynamic entropy, S [6,7], we come to an important 
theoretical and practical result: time (interval of time) equals, with an accuracy to the positive 
constant, to a change of the thermodynamic entropy ΔS (the entropy production Σ for a process in an 
isolated system). 
Δτ ∝ Σ. (7) 
The formula (7) makes it possible to calculate the time of an evolving system based on the 
calculations of entropy production. Local non-equilibrium thermodynamics provides a convenient 
method for calculating entropy production as a sum of products of thermodynamic forces and fluxes. 
Despite the fact that the possibility of introducing time for arbitrary systems (specifically, not 
physical-and-chemical ones) becomes smaller as we gradually move from Equations (1) to (7), the 
thermodynamic formulation, without a doubt, is convenient. At the same time, the scope of 
applicability of Equation (7) remains sufficient and covers a very wide class of problems for which 
local non-equilibrium thermodynamics is applicable: from stars to living organisms. It is interesting 
to note that, using Equation (7) and arguments similar to those mentioned above (see the discussion 
of the maximum trajectory entropy), one can obtain the maximum thermodynamic entropy and 
maximum entropy production principles well known in the literature [6–10]. 
In conclusion of this section, we would like to show how understanding of the relation of time 
and entropy production makes it possible to look at well-known results from a new perspective. So, 
it is often said that the Sun is a source of life for the Earth. Indeed, the Sun is a giant thermonuclear 
‘machine’ producing entropy (see, for example, [11]) and sending it in the form of an entropy flux to 
our planet. According to (7), it can be metaphorically considered as a flux of time which is sent by the 








Figure 4. One-to-one correspondence between the number Γ of microstates (representing some state
(macrostate) at some moment of time, τ and the number, Ω, of trajectories (ways) linking the past with
these microstates.
Let us consider some isolated system transit ng from one thermodynamic equil brium state to
another thermodynamic equilibrium state during the ti . st te is traditiona ly described
in statistical physics by the Boltzma n–Gi bs entropy, SBG, that is co nected with the nu ber of
a t ’s i , BG f i , the given energy of the system), as SBG ∝ lnГBG [6,7].
Obviously, SBG is a particular case of SS. As a result, based on Equations (3) and (4), we write:
τ ∝ SBG, (5)
∆τ ∝ ∆ SBG. (6)
Thus, it is shown that, for a nu ber of important cases, time (duration of a process) can b
calculated by a variation in the B ltzmann–Gibbs entropy. Since this entropy is traditionally regarded
as the statistic i terpretation of the thermodynamic entropy, S [6,7], we come to n important t oretical
and practical result: time (interval of time) equals, with an accuracy to the positive constant, to a change
of the thermodynamic entropy ∆S (the entropy production Σ for a process in an isolated system).
∆τ ∝ Σ. (7)
The formula (7) makes it possible to calculate the time of an evolving system based on the
calculations of entropy production. Local non-equilibrium thermodynamics provides a convenient
method for calculating entropy production as a sum of products of thermodynamic forces and
fluxes. Despite the fact that the possibility of introducing time for arbitrary systems (specifically,
not physical-and-chemical ones) becomes smaller as we gradually move from Equations (1) to (7),
the thermodynamic formulation, without a doubt, is convenient. At the same time, the scope of
applicability of Equation (7) remains sufficient and covers a very wide class of problems for which local
non-equilibrium thermodynamics is applicable: from stars to living organisms. It is interesting to note
that, using Equation (7) and arguments similar to those mentioned above (see the discussion of the
maximum trajectory entropy), one can obtain the maximum thermodynamic entropy and maximum
entropy production principles well known in the literature [6–10].
In conclusion of this section, we would like to show how understanding of the relation of time
and entropy production makes it possible to look at well-known results from a new perspective. So,
it is often said that the Sun is a source of life for the Earth. Indeed, the Sun is a giant thermonuclear
‘machine’ producing entropy (see, for example, [11]) and sending it in the form of an entropy flux to
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our planet. According to (7), it can be metaphorically considered as a flux of time which is sent by the
nearest star to our planet and in which the Earth exists from its origin.
4. Discussion
Let us list and briefly discuss the main features of the measure of time introduced herein.
1. Measurability and Universality: The introduced measure of time does not require certain
periodical or non-equilibrium processes for consideration, local equilibrium, and the like. Instead,
it is necessary to have an arbitrary change and an observer who judges about time based on the
number of possible ways of describing this change (its duration). Here, this number can be either
indirectly measured (E-method) or theoretically calculated (T-method) by finding entropy at any
specific level of the consideration of a system. As a result, time is introduced using the method
enabling determination for a very wide range of problems in various branches of science. It is
important that the time defined here from rather general perspectives is consistent with a number
of other papers addressing a similar problem. Let us give three examples. (1) The expression of a
process’s time through thermodynamic entropy can be found in a number of physical studies
(see, for example, [2,12–14]). The following quotation of E. Mach demonstrates this very clearly
(quoting from [14], p. 145: “If the entropy of the world could be determined, it would be an absolute
measure of time and it would be, at best, nothing but a tautology to say that the entropy of the world
increases with time. Time, and the fact that certain changes take place in a definite sense, are one and
the same thing”. (2) In biology, time (biological time) related to the metabolic rate and entropy
production during life activities (see [3] and its references) is used to consider the time of living
and growth of living beings. (3) In psychology, the perception of the duration of time is associated
with an amount of energy consumed by neurons (and with other metabolic processes in the
brain) as well as the intensity of cognitive processes and the amount of information stored in
the memory [15,16]. The mentioned examples can be regarded as an independent evidence
corroborating the ideas developed herein.
2. Time is Relative and Subjective: Indeed, this quantity is often considered in physics as something
absolute and objective, independent of anything else. Einstein’s relativity theory has shaken
confidence in these ideas only to some extent. We base our reasoning here totally independently
of the mentioned traditional ideas. This is connected with the fact that time, while reflecting
objective changes in the world, is inseparable from an observer. The observer cannot be
abstract (metaphysical). Basic properties of the observer can be presently connected only with
characteristics of the human brain, which has been evolving together with the world. Hence,
the relativity and subjectivity of time. At the same time, it is the brain that ‘strives’ to reflect
changes in the surrounding world with minimum distortions. This is what prevents us from
drawing a conclusion that the human is unable to formulate laws describing and predicting
changes in the world. The ‘sense of time’ arises because the human represents a part of the
evolving world where everything interacts directly or indirectly to a certain extent. This sense
(understanding of time) is gradually adjusted in the course of evolution through individual and
collective experience (including, for instance, by science). As a result of such an adjustment
(synchronization), the brain’s understanding of changes in the world using time (for instance,
with the help of the T-model) allows reflecting the real surrounding world. Synchronization of
an observer and a process (as well as synchronization of different processes with each other)
suggests that the time introduced herein as an individual characteristic of every evolving process
can describe, in some cases, a number of interacted processes, i.e., be a system characteristic.
3. Directionality of Time (Arrow of Time): The introduced time is directional by its definition.
The farther the past and future horizons of some change, the more the possible ways of connecting
these horizons and, consequently, the longer the time. The human brain is the source of these
observations and predictions; as was mentioned above, it represents an open, ever-changing
(among other things, due to memory-related processes) and adaptive system. These properties
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of the brain prevent any reversibility from occurring in the results of its work. The described
interrelation of time and entropy also indicates the irreversibility of time. However, there is
a widely-spread opinion well expressed in the book [17]: “It’s very possible that this mysterious
irreversibility is of precisely the same character as the mysterious irreversibility in thermodynamics,
as codified in the Second Law: It’s a consequence of making approximations and throwing away information,
even though the deep underlying processes are all individually reversible”. The opinion defended herein
is totally opposite to this statement: nature is in principle irreversible, while equations (laws)
traditionally considered as ‘fundamental’ are approximate, which is the only reason of their
reversibility. The case is that the fundamentality of a law of nature is as historically anachronistic
as the absoluteness of space and time. It is well known from the times of K. Popper that any
absoluteness and firmness presuppose unscientific (pseudoscientific) laws (theories) rather than
scientific ones. Indeed, any scientific theory represents a continuous chain of improvements,
conjectures, and refutations. Examples from mechanics are the most well-known: the Kepler laws
were replaced with the Newton laws that were replaced with the laws of quantum mechanics
and the relativity theory. Yes, all of the above are the examples of reversible equations. However,
it does not prove the reversibility of the world. These equations are only brilliant guesses
that described some changes in nature within the accuracy required for their times. These laws
are not divinely conferred or, at least, rigorously obtained from the standpoint of mathematics.
These laws are fruits of our brain that observed the surrounding world and, under the influence of
a number of purely “human” qualities such as the principles of simplicity, beauty, correspondence,
and the like, approximately formulated these laws by discarding details and taking the essence.
The understanding of time is related to the human; however, any human-related science (biology,
psychology, history, archaeology, linguistics, etc.) demonstrates the arrow of time and, therefore,
the true nature of time cannot be reversible. For this reason, the majority of time measures used in
physics are logically (not practically) invalid because they are based on time-reversible concepts
of the modern quantum and electromagnetic theories and, hence, contradict the crucial property
of time.
4. Non-Uniformity of Time: According to the introduced definition as well as the relation of time
and entropy (entropy production) under discussion, time is obviously non-uniform. Although,
it absolutely contradicts the understanding of time that has appeared in science thanks to
I. Newton, one cannot claim that this statement is original today. For instance, there is a
well-known quotation of H. Poincaré [18]: “We have not a direct intuition of the equality of two
intervals of time. The persons who believe they possess this intuition are dupes of an illusion. When I say,
from noon to one the same time passes as from two to three, what meaning has this affirmation? The least
reflection shows that by itself it has none at all. It will only have that which I choose to give it, by a
definition which will certainly possess a certain degree of arbitrariness”. It is important to note that the
understanding of time being non-uniform (non-linearly connected with the “time” hypothetically
considered uniform) turns out to be a crucial, necessary, and commonly-accepted provision for a
very wide range of problems solved by theoretical biology and psychology, specifically when
addressing the issues of ontogenesis and development (see, for example, [3]). Non-uniform
time scales are also sometimes used in physics. This is especially true for cosmological
questions. There are well-known, now classical, works by E. Milne [1,19], where he obtains
two logarithmically-interrelated measures of time while building his cosmology. Nowadays,
these works of the last mid-century have become especially topical in connection with the dark
energy problem. A number of contemporary cosmologists involve the idea of non-uniformity of
time by either developing the ideas of Milne or arriving at them independently [20–24].
5. Conclusions and Prospects
The present study introduces the measure of time as a number of ways by which our brain
links the past with the future. The interrelation of this measure of time with entropy and energy is
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discussed. Obviously, the formulated approach to the problem (specifically, the T-model) allows using
the introduced measure of time in different sciences, both natural and human. Using the single measure
of time, one can attempt to solve the fundamental problems and issues mentioned in the Introduction.
There may be an impression that the questions discussed herein have nothing new to physics
and may be interesting only to other, not so much “developed, advanced and successful” sciences.
This viewpoint may be valid for applied physics but not for theoretical one, its foundation. We shall
reason this viewpoint. Laws of physics concisely generalize the known and predict the unknown.
They are only approximated to the “truth” and are formulated by people based on the existing
experience, using some adopted model (a simplified picture) of the world. There is no confidence
therefore that these laws could be valid for another model of the world that significantly differs from
the previous one. Different models are used to describe mechanical, quantum, and electromagnetic
phenomena. Considerably different models are employed in different areas of cosmology, etc. Laws
cannot be separated from the system: a model of the world and their creator (human), i.e., laws are
products (corollaries) of the system. However, there is often a temptation to consider a law outside its
system by ascribing it such properties as fundamentality and absoluteness. As a result, the law becomes
detached from the model and attempts are made to apply it to other models. For instance, there are
endeavors to apply the second law of thermodynamics to the evolution of the Universe, to explain the
irreversibility of the diffusion processes by laws of mechanics, or to employ the quantum theory to
problems solved by the general relativity theory. Such an approach is very risky from the methodical
perspective (especially, if models are considerably different) and one cannot predict whether it becomes
promising for the development of science. This is a roulette of some kind: a scientist can unexpectedly
discover/explain something or arrive at paradoxes and waste their scientific life (and scientific lives of
other people too) on solving them. Can it be that a number of famous physical paradoxes existing in
quantum mechanics, statistical physics, cosmology, etc. are among them? A law can contradict the
world’s model if this model is rather different from the model on the basis of which the law has been
previously formulated. Such thoughts were expressed before, specifically, by E. Milne [19]: “To begin
with laws of nature and then add an arbitrary content on which the laws are to act is logically self-stultifying;
for we have no guarantee that the laws assumed are compatible with the content assumed.” The idea defended
herein can be illustrated by another example. Let us have a three-dimensional world and propose
a model based on the axioms of the Euclidian geometry in order to describe it. Within this model,
we derive some theorem (for example, the triangle sum theorem). This theorem (law) is applicable
only within the framework of our model. If we now replace the world’s model, for instance, by the
Lobachevsky model, then the use of the obtained law of angles will be absurd and lead to paradoxes.
It is especially dangerous when basic concepts such as, for example, time represent an integral
part of a specific model forming a law, and then this law claims to be universal (i.e., is applied to
other models and fields of science). Classical mechanics with its understanding of the absolute time
represents a vivid example.
What methodological solution can be used to address the above problem? Firstly, basic concepts
(like time) should be formulated in such a manner that they could be introduced (and calculated)
at different levels and for the maximum number of models used in the modern science. Then these
concepts should be defined more precisely for some model at hand intended to describe some
phenomenon of the surrounding world. Afterwards, using the introduced concepts and model (some
set of axioms and hypotheses), laws should be deductively obtained. These laws and their corollaries
should be compared with the phenomena of the surrounding world. In case some deviations and
problems are found, the world’s model should be adjusted and the cycle should repeat. Such a process
of tests and corrections will be an endless movement towards the truth: the evolution of science. At the
same time, basic concepts should be treated extremely conservatively. These concepts concern and link
the entire framework of science with its multiple models, i.e., form the basis of our scientific worldview.
Basic concepts (like time) should be kept outside changes (adjustments) until the overwhelming
majority of modern natural and human sciences “call” for their revision. With this approach, we seem
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to have no fundamental laws claiming to explain anything and everything. However, we would have
basic (fundamental) concepts representing a scientific reference point in the surrounding world not
divided by various sciences into areas of interest. One can hope that the ideas concerning time and its
properties considered herein will be beneficial in this regard.
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